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INTRODUCTION
Malaysia is a highly plural society since ancient 
times, i.e. the pre-colonial period, in contrast 
to most scholars theorizing the phenomenon 
as a product of colonization.  As a plural 
society, nation building has always been a great 
challenge for Malaysia (Shamsul, 1997).  The 
ethnic composition of this country comprises 
two major constitutional categories, namely 
Bumiputera (literally means ‘prince of the soil’) 
and non-Bumiputera.  Of the total population of 
Malaysia in Census 2000, Bumiputera made up 
65.1 percent.  The Bumiputera category consists 
of the Malays and the indigenous peoples of 
Peninsula Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak (for 
instance, Orang Asli, Kadazan, Iban, etc.).  On 
the other hand, the Chinese (26.0 percent) and 
Indians (7.7 percent) form the majority of the 
non-Bumiputera category.
The ethnic distribution has not altered 
considerably in view of the rapid growth of 
the Malaysian population.  The two main 
demographic categories of the population, i.e. 
Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera, have been 
regarded as critical in sustaining ethnic balance 
in Malaysia.  In particular, the Sino-Malay 
relationship plays a pivotal role in the politics 
of Malaysia’s nation building.  The politics of 
nation-building in Malaysia is basically the 
politics of mediating identities.  The politics of 
identity in Malaysia illustrates the prevailing 
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contradictions of various notions of nation-
of-intent both inter and intra ethnic groups 
(Shamsul, 1996).
The issue of ethnicity characterizes the very 
basis of Malaysian politics.  This is reflected by 
the fact that political struggles are often fought on 
an ethnic basis and the tendency of most political 
issues to be perceived in terms of ethnics. 
This is a prevailing phenomenon in Malaysian 
politics since its independence in 1957.  Thus, 
the main objective of this article is to examine 
the Chinese’s political involvement, both their 
bureaucratic participation and reaction to Malay 
dominance in the country in the different periods, 
i.e. pre- and post-1970, and post-2008 General 
Elections.  This writing is greatly contingent 
upon a content analysis on the secondary data 
collected from the reports, journal articles, book 
chapters, and newspaper articles.
There are four main parts in this paper. 
The first part is to examine the Chinese’s 
involvement in politic before 1970.  The second 
part scrutinizes Malaysian Chinese’s political 
involvement after the implementation of the 
New Economy Policy after 1970.  In the third 
part, the author looks further into some critical 
ethnic-related issues prior to the 2008 general 
election.  In the final part, the author analyzes 
some latest trends emerging in the Malaysian 
Chinese’s reactions in the midst of the Malay 
dominance.
CHINEsE’s POLITICAL 
INVOLVEMENT IN THE  
PRE-1970 PERIOD 
In order to understand the Chinese’s political 
involvement prior to 1970s, the concepts of 
“horizontal solidarity” and “vertical division” 
are useful (Ho, 2002).  In Ho’s analysis, the 
coalition of the three ethnic communities in the 
Alliance which formed the pre-1970 Malaysia 
a quasi-consociational state happened only at 
the elite level.  Within the political organization 
of the United Malays National Organisation 
(UMNO), Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) 
and Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), the top 
elites had, albeit disagreements and conflicts of 
interests, attempted to strengthen a “horizontal 
solidarity” among them.  They were mostly 
western-educated, conservative, strongly 
nationalistic, and deeply committed to communal 
interests.  They shared an experience that was 
unique in the Malaysian political history.  In the 
framework of “horizontal solidarity”, decisions 
were made with the participation of these 
leaders, although their roles in policy-making 
might not be equally significant.  Apparently, 
the Alliance during the initial period of its 
association was more broadly based in terms of 
ethnic participatory decisions.  Besides this, the 
coalition of ethnic elites functioned at two levels 
of the bargaining process: internal and external. 
The former was the internal bargaining among 
the ethnic elites themselves.  This happened, for 
example, in the negotiations of the Constitution 
in 1957.  The latter was a united group with an 
external entity.  This was illustrated in 1957 
when the UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance claimed 
independence from the British.
On the other hand, in the context of 
“vertical division”, the various ethnic groups 
were segregated in a plural society.  Political 
interactions and communications were extremely 
limited at individual, group, and organizational 
levels.  While ethnic groups accommodated 
each other in their daily lives, there was very 
little exchange of political views.  Besides, there 
were also internal divisions among the ethnic 
Malaysian Chinese.  Indeed, the Malaysian 
Chinese elites were not homogeneous.  There 
were divided by circumstances and traditions, 
cultural heterogeneity, and class.  Intra-Chinese 
divisions were also accelerated by pro-Malay 
policies.  UMNO’s dominance within the Alliance 
made the MCA less capable of delivering rewards 
to their ethnic-group client.  While bargaining 
existed, the decisions were usually in favour of 
the UMNO.  Hence, the MCA consistently failed 
to satisfy the demands of its Chinese electorate. 
It, therefore, became alienated from the Chinese 
grass roots that began to withdraw their support. 
Indeed, the MCA’s inability to deliver cultural, 
political and economic goods led to elite-mass 
political divisions within the Chinese community 
(Ho, 2002).
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Meanwhile, Chinese-based opposition 
parties emerged.  They were Democratic Action 
Party (DAP) and Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia 
(Gerakan) (Lee, 1987).  DAP was a consistent 
critic of MCA.  Gerakan was inaugurated in 
1968 and it brought together key leaders from 
two other non-Malay opposition parties, United 
Democratic Party and Labour Party.  These two 
political parties were highly vocal in criticizing 
the Malay-dominated state and its policies, 
and championed non-Malay rights in terms of 
education, language, and culture.  With these 
alternatives, the Chinese voters were able to 
have a choice in terms of selecting their own 
representatives.  Political divisions within the 
Chinese community, in particular among the 
voters, were intensified.
The most distinguishing feature in the 
Malaysian political system, as far as ethnic 
Chinese political participation is concerned, 
was the representation they enjoyed at the 
elite level.  Important cabinet positions, 
such as the portfolio of the finance ministry, 
were held by MCA politicians traditionally. 
However, many important issues were decided 
in the UMNO’s favour.  The appearance of the 
political representation remained as an important 
selling point for the MCA to its supporters and 
sympathizers.
CHINEsE’s POLITICAL 
INVOLVEMENT AFTER 1970
There are two important aspects in the 
understanding of the Chinese’s political 
involvement after 1970, i.e. the shifting of the 
Chinese votes and the Chinese representatives’ 
bureaucratic involvement in the government 
administrat ive system or  bureaucrat ic 
participation.  The shifting of the votes 
indicated the response of the Chinese voters 
towards establishment and the role of MCA in 
representing the Chinese society.  The May 13 
riot and the 1969 general election have brought 
notable impacts on both the Malay and Chinese 
politics.  Compared to the previous general 
elections, the percentage of votes received by the 
Alliance for the first time went below 50 percent. 
The significant shift of the Chinese votes to the 
opposition in many ways continued in the next 
two decades with only one or two exceptions 
(see Table 1).
As stated in Table 2, MCA emerged from 
this election with one of its worst results in 
the 1986 general election.  It contested for 32 
parliamentary seats but won only 17.  Of the 69 
state seats the party contested, it won 43.  The 17 
parliamentary seats that the MCA won accounted 
for only 9.6 per cent of the total 177 seats in the 
parliament, and this was the lowest percentage 
the party had won in any election.
TABLE 1 
Percentage of votes in Malaysia’s parliamentary elections, 1959-90
Year
Percentage of votes
Alliance/BN DAP PAS* Independents Others
1959 51.8 - 21.30 4.80 22.1
1964 58.5 - 14.60 0.70 26.2
1969 44.9 11.9 20.90 1.80 20.5
1974 60.7 18.3 - 6.00 15.0
1978 57.2 19.1 15.50 4.60 3.4
1982 60.5 19.6 14.50 3.80 1.7
1986 57.6 21.1 15.30 3.20 3.0
1990 52.0 16.5 6.57 3.08 14.4**
* Pan Malaysian Islamic Party (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia)
** Semangat 46
(Source: Ho, 2002)
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According to Ho’s analysis on 1986 general 
election, one way to look at the response of the 
ethnic Chinese voters to MCA and examine 
its implications for the political process was 
to look at the support of the ethnic groups in 
the constituencies (Ho, 1988).  The results 
indicated that of the 17 seats won by MCA, 15 
were in the constituencies where Malay voters 
constituted more than 34 percent.  The margin 
of votes enjoyed by the MCA candidates showed 
that the seats were won on the strength of the 
Malay votes.  Only two candidates were elected 
in the Chinese majority constituencies, where 
ethnic Chinese voters constituted more than 50 
percent of the voting population.  The analysis 
also revealed that the 15 parliamentary seats lost 
by MCA were all won by the DAP candidates. 
It is worth highlighting the fact that the voter 
composition of these constituencies consisted of 
more than 49 percent Chinese voters.
In short, Ho (2002) suggested that the MCA 
candidates were elected on the basis of the Malay 
votes.  This pattern was repeated in the past few 
general elections and it likely appeared to be 
so.  The MCA candidates in Chinese-majority 
constituencies were defeated.  This showed that 
the Chinese voters seemed to have forsaken 
MCA and a protest movement in the Chinese 
community against the establishment was taking 
effect.  The Chinese community was less than 
happy with the administration and the votes of 
protest by Chinese voters against the government 
inevitably were cast against MCA because of the 
perception of the community at large of growing 
Chinese helplessness and political impotence to 
influence policy within the administration.
In spite of the lack of grass-roots Chinese 
support, MCA appeared to have done well 
in terms of representation in the coalition 
government at the cabinet level.  Table 3 shows 
the MCA representatives in the government 
from 1955 to 2000.  The number of the Chinese 
ministers appeared to be consistent (4), except 
in 1980-81 and 1986-87 (5 and 6, respectively). 
The number of deputy ministers increased over 
the years, and this seemed to be the portfolio 
which the UMNO was more willing to assign 
to MCA representatives.  The bureaucratic 
involvement of the MCA in the government 
increased marginally over time as compared 
with its popular electorate support which at 
best remained constant.  However, after 1969, 
important portfolios in the government like 
finance, international trade and industry, and 
education were no longer assigned to MCA 
representatives and this further signified the 
impotency of MCA in influencing policy making 
in the administration although the number of 
their representatives in the government was 
unchanged.
Besides MCA, Gerakan is another Chinese-
based political party.  However, the support 
of the Chinese towards the party was rather 
inconsistent.  In 1969, Gerakan participated in 
TABLE 2 
 MCA’s performance in the parliamentary elections, 1955-86
Year Parliamentary seats won Total number of parliamentary seats
Percentage of 
representation
1955 15 52 28.85
1959 19 104 18.27
1964 27 104 25.96
1969 13 104 12.50
1974 19 114 16.67
1978 17 154 11.40
1982 24 154 15.58
1986 17 177 9.60
Source: Ho (2002)
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the general election for the first time and won 
8 out of the 14 seats contested.  The number of 
parliamentary seat reduced to 5 after they joined 
BN and it won only 4 seats in 1978 elections. 
In 1982 elections, the number increased by 
one to 5 and this number retained for 1986 and 
1990 elections.  It received votes from both the 
Chinese and non-Chinese, as witnessed in the 
state voting in Penang, although its image was 
essentially a Chinese-based party.  Its influence 
in government remained limited, as its political 
leaders were given less important ministerial 
portfolios.
In comparison with the MCA and Gerakan, 
DAP as an oppositional party is not much 
different from the aspect of parliamentary and 
state elections.  Based on the data for the 1969 
general elections presented in Table 4, DAP 
achieved a big win with 13 parliamentary seats 
and replaced Pan Malayan Islamic Party (PAS) 
TABLE 3 
MCA representatives in government, 1955-2000
Year Minister Deputy Minister Parliamentary Secretary
1955-58 4 1 0
1958-63 4 1 0
1964 4 2 2
1964-66 4 2 2
1967-68 4 3 1
1968-73 4 1 0
1973-74 4 1 0
1974-76 4 3 1
1976-78 4 3 2
1979 4 6 0
1980-81 5 5 1
1982 4 6 1
1983-85 4 6 1
1986-87 6 6 1
1988 4 6 1
1989-90 4 6 1
1997-94 4 6 2
1995-99 4 6 2
2000 4 6 2
Source: Ho, 2002
TABLE 4 
Performance of DAP in general elections, 1969-90
Year Parliamentary seats State seats
1969 13 31
1974 9 23
1978 16 2
1982 9 12
1986 24 37
1990 20 44
Source: Ho, 2002
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as the biggest oppositional party in the country. 
In the 1974 election, DAP won only 9 seats and 
in 1978, we witnessed a shift, i.e. the support 
went back to DAP as it won 16 seats which were 
mainly from Penang.  Nevertheless, the support 
for DAP was decreased in 1982 and it was able 
to maintain only 6 seats.  In the 1986 election, 
DAP won 24 seats, more than the ones won in 
combination for MCA and Gerakan.  In the 1990 
election, the number of seats it won slightly 
decreased to 20.
Even though DAP is a multiethnic party, 
in reality, majority of the party members are 
Chinese.  Therefore, besides fighting issues 
on civil rights and promoting corruption free 
government, DAP plays important role as a 
defender and fighter for the rights and needs of 
the Chinese community.  With that, DAP is said 
to continuously exist as a champion of urban and 
Chinese rights, and is unlikely to shed its image 
of a Chinese-based party.
Based on Thock’s research, the Chinese 
politic elites in BN were facing a dilemma and 
this caused the Chinese association (Huatuan) 
leaders to stand out to fight for the Chinese fate 
in the form of political protest.  The indirect 
involvement of Huatuan in politics had been 
identified prior to the independence of Malaya. 
Before this, Huatuan heavily contingent upon 
Chinese political parties to fight for the Chinese’s 
right.  The failure of the Chinese political 
parties in fulfilling their mandate had caused 
the Huatuan leaders to make a decision to be 
indirectly involved in politic (Thock, 2005).
The implementation of the 3M Scheme 
(membaca, menulis and mengira) in 1983 was 
perceived by the Chinese community as a mean 
to change and dilute the cultural characteristics 
of the Chinese schools.  This had triggered the 
Huatuan, especially Dongjiaozong, to protest 
aggressively to the implementation.  The fact that 
the Chinese politicians failed to convey the needs 
and appeals of the Chinese in the parliament and 
to the government had driven the leaders from 
Dongjiaozong to take a drastic step and become 
directly involved in politics.
By involving themselves in politics, 
Dongjiaozong leaders aimed to unite the forces 
among the Chinese political parties from multi-
levels, i.e. inside (the government), outside (the 
oppositional parties), and Huatuan, as a strong 
political coalition to fight for the Chinese’s right. 
This combination of the three main political 
forces in the Chinese community was named as 
Sanjiehe (Thock, 2005).
In the 1982 election, a group of Chinese 
education activists in Dongjiaozong was 
represented by Kerk Choo Ting, Koh Tsu Koon, 
Kang Chin Seng, and Ong Tin Kin who joined 
Gerakan individually.  The mission entrusted 
by Dongjiaozong to these candidates was 
“Enter the Barisan, Modify the Barisan.”  They 
were hoped to win in the election and enter the 
parliament.  They were given the mandate to 
speak and defend for the Chinese’s right, and to 
prevent the policies which might bring injustice 
to the Chinese community in general, and to 
the Chinese educational system, in particular. 
Among the four, only Koh Tsu Koon won 
in Tanjung, Penang, but the involvement of 
Dongjiaozong in the elections had influenced the 
electoral pattern among the Chinese electorates, 
especially towards MCA and Gerakan.  Both 
parties won tremendously compared to the 
previous elections.
Huatuan politics of protest was also 
manifested in a few events.  In 1983, they 
forwarded the Cultural Declaration and National 
Culture Memorandum to protest against the 
implementation of National Cultural Policy 
which was perceived by them as Malay-centric 
and a threat to the survival of the Chinese 
culture in Malaysia.  During the 1986 election, 
they suggested the Joint Declaration by Chinese 
Guilds and Associations of Malaysia 1985 
(PBPCM) and the Civil Right Movement 
(CRC) was formed by 15 Huatuan to achieve 
PBPCM’s purposes.  Similar action was taken 
by the Huatuan in the 1999 election when they 
submitted “Suqiu”, i.e. “Election Appeals”, a 
17 points memorandum on 16 August 1999 to 
BN.
At that time, the 15 Huatuan was considered 
by the main Chinese association to function as 
a leader in playing pivotal role in protesting 
against the administration of BN/UMNO.  To 
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contest the political power of BN/UMNO, 
CRC once suggested Two Parties System so as 
to enhance a better democratic environment in 
Malaysia.  The effort to achieve the system was 
evident when 27 leaders and activists of Huatuan 
joined DAP during the 1990 election, i.e. after 
the mass political arrest through Operasi Lalang 
in 1987.
As a conclusion, it can be said that after 
the 1970, the Chinese community has been 
sidelined in politics.  The Malay dominance 
under UMNO’s flagship and the reign of Dr 
Mahathir were the main factors that contributed 
to their position remaining in the sidelines 
only (Thock, 2008).  This has resulted in the 
Chinese community facing many difficulties in 
the sectors of economy, education, and culture. 
The degradation of the Chinese’s right in these 
areas has given rise to the dilemma among the 
Chinese community in Malaysia.
POLITICAL sCENARIO PRIOR TO THE 
2008 GENERAL ELECTION
In 2004, the governing coalition was able to 
achieve one of its greatest victories in more than 
50 years (Wong, 2005).  BN won 198 out of 219 
seats in the national parliament and 505 of 552 
seats at the state level.  In total, BN won 64.4 
percent of the votes, i.e. 7.2 percent more points 
than in 1999.  The UMNO candidates came first 
in 109 of 117 constituencies (93.2 percent).  PAS, 
on the other hand, lost the election in the state of 
Terengganu and has since had only seven seats in 
the national parliament (six after by-elections). 
PKR (People Justice Party or Parti Keadilan 
Rakyat) had only one Member of Parliament 
(MP), while DAP was the only opposition party 
that reached its goal, with twelve delegates in 
the national parliament (Ufen, 2008).
The main reason for the BN success in 
2004 was the popularity of the Prime Minister 
Abdullah Badawi, who had taken over the 
PM office in October 2003.  He maintained a 
leadership style which is different from that 
of his autocratic predecessor, Dr. Mahathir 
Mohamad.  Abdullah is an orthodox Muslim and 
comes from an influential Malay family of ulama 
(Islamic scholars).  Soon after assuming office, 
he introduced a number of reforms.  After 2004, 
however, it became obvious that he had failed 
to deliver his promises of fighting corruption 
and poverty, as well as improving the tensed 
relationship among religious and ethnic groups. 
More importantly, expensive prestige projects 
were mostly not cancelled (Ufen, 2008).
Abdullah has been criticized by his 
predecessor, Mahathir since 2006.  In August 
2006, Mahathir even demanded for Abdullah’s 
resignation.  Such criticism probably contributed 
to the weakening of the Prime Minister’s 
position.  Furthermore, the opposition criticized 
the Prime Minister for his half-hearted fight 
against corruption.  Indeed, there was hardly 
anyone from the political and business elites 
charged or sentenced for corruption.
In addition, the deterioration of interethnic 
and interreligious relations was widely debated 
in the Malaysian public.  During the last few 
UMNO congresses, the Minister of Education, 
Hishammuddin Tun Hussein, chairman of the 
UMNO Youth Organization, wielded a keris 
(Malay dagger) as a sign of Malay supremacy 
(Ketuanan Melayu).  This was interpreted by the 
non-Malays, especially the Chinese, as an act 
of Malay chauvinism.  Ethnic minorities have 
regarded such development with a strong feeling 
of inquietude.
Brown (2008) suggested that there were 
three broad sets of political issues which had 
raised popular discontent to the levels not seen 
since the political turmoil, following Mahathir’s 
dismissal and the imprisonment of his popular 
deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, in 1998.  The first set 
of issues revolved around political corruption, 
particularly two scandals that had dominated 
the previous year.  First, the publicization of a 
video apparently showing a senior lawyer, V.K. 
Lingam, brokering the appointment of judges, 
and secondly, the trial of Abdul Razak Baginda, 
a political commentator linked to the deputy 
premier Najib Razak, on the charges of being 
an accomplice to murder.  The victim was a 
Mongolian citizen – who had seemingly acted 
as a translator on a defence deal brokered by 
Abdul Razak Baginda – who had been killed; 
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the prosecution claimed, by two policemen 
acting at the defendant’s behest.  Eventually, 
Razak Baginda was sentenced not guilty and 
released in 2009.
The second set of issues related to the 
startling mobilization of the country’s Indian 
minority.  Increasingly seen as politically 
marginalized, with high poverty rates but 
lacking access to the affirmative action policies 
that benefit the majority Malay community, the 
Indian population has nonetheless been largely 
politically compliant.  However, provocative 
actions by the government, including the 
destruction of Hindu temples standing in the way 
of development projects, provoked a dramatic 
response, with tens of thousands turning out in a 
protest rally in November 2007.  The responses 
to this protest – five of its leaders were detained 
without trial under the country’ Internal Security 
Act (ISA) and 30 protestors were charged with 
the attempted murder of a policeman – further 
alienated many Indians from the government.
The third set of issues related to the basic 
bread-and-butter economic issues which had 
risen to the fore, particularly the spiralling 
rate of inflation, largely a product of global oil 
price hikes.  While the Malaysian government 
subsidized the cost of fuel – to the tune of some 
RM40 billion (US$12.44 billion) in 2007, over 
10 percent of the government expenditure – 
pump prices have risen annually by some 10 
percent in the recent years, with effects for 
other prices, particularly for basic goods and 
services.  In January 2008, a protest organized 
by the NGO ‘Coalition Against Inflation’ was 
violently broken up by the police, with some 
50 protestors and opposition activists arrested. 
Rising international prices have also led to 
shortages in basic goods, including flour, sugar, 
and cooking oil.
Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi dissolved 
the parliament with the consent of the King on 
February 13, 2008.  The Election Commission 
scheduled the elections for March 8.  While BN 
over and over again highlighted its economic 
successes throughout the campaign, the 
opposition highlighted numerous examples 
of government’s neglect, particularly the still 
prevalent corruption, the high crime rates, 
and the government’s refusal to reform the 
police force against the advice of the Royal 
Commission.
THE CHINEsE’s REACTION AFTER 8 
MARCH 2008
The outcome of the 2008 general elections 
revealed that Malaysians were seeking for a 
drastic change.  BN has failed to maintain its 
two-thirds majority seats in the Parliament.  It 
is the worst ever loss in history for the ruling 
coalition led by UMNO since the 1959 general 
election.  BN only managed to secure 140 seats 
out of the 222 seats, i.e. 63 percent seats (BN 
lost another parliamentary seat in a by-election 
in Kuala Terengganu on 17 January 2009). 
The only election which was close to this in its 
outcome was that of 1969.  The then governing 
coalition under the banner of Alliance won 66 
percent of the seats in the Parliament.
The three opposition parties, People’s 
Justice Party (or Parti Keadilan Rakyat, PKR), 
DAP and PAS, formed an electoral pact with 
each other prior to the poll, harvested 37 percent 
of the seats.  At present, the three parties formed 
a post-election alliance, unofficially called as 
Barisan Rakyat (People’s Front).  If the outcome 
is based on total ballots for the seats in the 
Parliament, BN only gained 51.5 percent of the 
popular vote from the 7.9 million ballots cast 
on 8 March.
In the 2008 election, the opposition parties 
won five state assemblies.  These were Kelantan, 
a poor Malay-dominated state controlled by 
PAS since 1990; Kedah, another largely Malay 
state which the opposition had come close to 
capturing in 1999; Penang, an affluent, Chinese-
dominated state that had often voted for the 
opposition but had fallen to the opposition 
control only in 1969; Perak, a large ethnically 
mixed state on the west coast; and Selangor, the 
urbanized state surrounding Kuala Lumpur, the 
capital.  In addition, BN was roundly defeated 
in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, which 
does not have a state assembly, winning only one 
of the 11 parliamentary seats.  In general, BN lost 
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the popular vote in West Malaysia (49.8 percent), 
winning exactly the same number of votes as 
the three main opposition parties combined, as 
shown in Table 5.
According to an analysis by Brown (2008) 
on the dynamics of the ethnic voting in Malaysia, 
BN has traditionally done best in ethnically 
mixed constituencies, losing support to PAS in 
the predominantly Malay constituencies and to 
DAP in predominantly Chinese constituencies. 
Meanwhile, the urban Chinese-dominated 
constituencies, the bedrock of DAP support, 
swung even further away from BN, and in the 
multi-ethnic seat, where BN typically excelled, 
the drop in BN support was most evident, for 
instance, in Wangsa Maju (Kuala Lumpur), 
Kelana Jaya (Selangor), and Balik Pulau 
(Penang).
Brown’s analysis also showed that the swing 
to the opposition was smallest among the Malay 
population, i.e. around 5 percent, but between 
20-25 percent of the Chinese voters switched to 
the opposition.  A survey conducted at the end 
of January 2008 by Merdeka Centre illustrated 
that only 38 percent of the Indian and 42 percent 
of the Chinese population was satisfied with 
Abdullah Badawi’s performance (Brown, 2008). 
According to Ong (2008), 58 percent of Malays 
but only 35 percent of Chinese and 48 percent 
of Indians voted for BN candidates in West 
Malaysia.  The swung votes from BN to the 
opposition amounted to 5 percent of the points 
among the Malays, while these were 30 and even 
35 percent of the points among the Indians and 
the Chinese, respectively.  However, it is not 
apparent whether the results are due to protest 
votes or whether they signify a genuine change 
in their electoral behaviour (Brown, 2008).
In view of Chinese’s bureaucratically 
involvement in the government administration, 
although majority Chinese candidates in BN 
failed in 2008 elections, but the number of 
Chinese representatives assigned to ministerial 
post was not reduced.  While MCA remained its 
number, i.e. 4 ministers and 6 deputy ministers, 
Gerakan was only assigned one deputy minister 
TABLE 5 
Seats in the national parliament since 1990 (Most important parties)
Party
Year
1990 1995 1999 2004 2008
Barisan Nasional 127 162 148 198 140
UMNO 71 88 72 109 79
MCA 18 30 28 31 15
PBB 10 13 10 11 14
MIC 6 6 7 9 3
Gerakan 5 7 7 10 2
Opposition 49 30 45 20 82
PAS 7 7 27 7 23*
PKN (since 2004: PKR) - - 5 1 31
DAP 20 9 10 12 28
PBS (since 2004 part of BN) 14 8 3 ** -
Semangat 46*** 8 6 - - -
Total 180 192 193 219 222
(Source: Ufen, 2008)
* Become 24 seats when won another parliamentary seat in a by-election held in Kuala Terenganu on 17 
January, 2009.
** Four seats for BN
*** Breakaway party from UMNO. Most of its members returned to UMNO in 1996.
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post.  At the state level, albeit Penang has 
been traditionally dominated by the Chinese 
representative, Perak has increased the number 
of the Chinese representatives as the members 
of the Perak State Executive Council (Exco). 
Six out of 11 state executive council members 
are Chinese representatives.  This number has 
increased in double compared to the previous 
one, which there were only three Chinese 
in the council but, the number of Chinese 
representatives was reduced to one in the new 
state executive council when BN seized power 
from Pakatan Rakyat in February 2009.
However,  most  poli t ical  observers 
and analysts deem the number of Chinese 
representative in bureaucratic participation 
is no longer significant because the country’s 
political pattern is moving towards multiracial 
(Raviechandren, 19 March 2008).  Communal-
based politic has become insignificant in its 
influence to the country’s politics.  In the 2008 
elections, we could observe that the Malays 
were no longer hesitant in supporting DAP, the 
Chinese were brave in casting their votes to PAS 
and the Indians wore PAS t-shirt and supported 
PAS openly (Thock, 2008). 
A political new wave in 2008 elections 
showed weaknesses in UMNO’s performance. 
This led to BN’s component parties, namely 
MCA and Gerakan have become more vocal 
in expressing their dissatisfactions.  They have 
started to question about the parties’ subordinated 
position in BN in comparison with UMNO.  For 
examples, the ex-president of Gerakan, Dr. 
Lim Keng Yek in a newspaper interview had 
illustrated the status of other BN’s component 
parties is like a beggar compared to UMNO. 
The formal Minister of Human Resource and 
formal Vice President of MCA, Dr. Fong Chan 
Onn too urged for MCA to have an equal position 
or status as UMNO has.  Meanwhile, the formal 
Minister of Health, Dr. Chua Soi Lek suggested 
that the rest twelve BN component parties, 
except UMNO and Parti Pesaka Bumiputera 
Bersatu (PBB) from Sarawak, to form an alliance 
to contest against UMNO in BN.  Related to 
this, the formal member of Penang Executive 
Council, Dr Toh Kim Woon , said that if UMNO 
continually suppressed Gerakan, it was better 
for Gerakan to leave BN  during the immediate 
aftermath of  the general elections (Thock, 
2008).
The new stand of MCA has become 
noticeable in its discourse on the issue of 
“Ketuanan Melayu” or Malay dominance. 
The former president, Ong Ka Ting openly 
advocated that he is strongly disagreeing with 
the Malay political dominance.  In the first 
Parliamentary meeting, in a loud voice, Ong Ka 
Ting requested the government to ensure larger 
religious freedom for the non-Muslim and to 
build new Chinese school in a more systematic 
and institutional manner.  The new elected 
president of MCA, Ong Tee Keat also criticized 
that the issue of the Malay dominance is no 
longer relevant in today context and it should 
not be manipulated by the Malay politicians. 
The new MCA leader further illustrated that the 
manipulations of Malay dominance brought the 
denotation that the unequal relationship between 
the Malays and the non-Malays was like master 
and slave relationship.
Another new trend found in post-2008 
general election is the changing of direction 
in BN’s Chinese-based component parties.  In 
a post-elections post-mortem meeting, MCA 
leaders identified that the previous direction, to be 
low profile, was no longer useful, and had caused 
a losing of support from Chinese community. 
Therefore, in the meeting, the leaders reached 
a consensus to change the direction of the party 
struggle to be more vocal and to fight for not 
only the right of Chinese community but also 
other racial groups.  The then vice president, Ong 
Tee Keat suggested MCA to change its direction 
towards multiethnic.
Meanwhile, former Gerakan president, Lim 
Keng Yek threw the idea that the non-Malay 
component parties in BN needed to be combined 
into a single multiethnic party in responding 
to the new political scenario in Malaysia.  The 
party veteran also said that the 8 March political 
tsunami had created a new political scenario 
which had triggered competition between the 
Malay parties and multiethnic parties.  In actual 
fact this idea is not new since the party youth 
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leader Mah Siew Kiong had suggested the idea 
to combine all parties in BN into one multiethnic 
party in the party 2007 annual assembly. 
However, the idea was totally rejected by 
UMNO deputy president, Najib Tun Razak and 
its youth chief, Hishammuddin Tun Hussein.
CONCLUsIONs
In the context of Malaysia, the delicate 
demography balance between the Bumiputera 
and immigrant populations inevitably constructed 
its political reality, in the form of Bumiputera 
versus non-bumiputera.  At the micro and 
everyday levels, it is dominated by the culture of 
difference but, at the macro level, it is dominated 
by a homogenizing ideology.  As Shamsul (1997) 
concludes, there is a clear tension between these 
two levels articulated in various forms.  Hence, 
Malaysia could be described as a state in stable 
tension.
Hitherto, the Chinese’s involvement and 
reaction in politics in Malaysia are significantly 
contingent upon the discourse of the Malay 
dominance.  The Chinese’s political mobilization 
and bureaucratic participation in the governmental 
administration are important in to be studied in 
order to understand their political behaviour. 
The so-called politic tsunami on 8 March, 
2008 has opened a new phase of the Malaysian 
political development.  The nature of politics 
in this country is said to have shifted from 
communal-based politic to multiethnic-based.  It 
is more interesting now to see how different the 
Chinese representatives struggle in this ‘more 
open’ political environment.
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